Commentary on: Frank Zenker\u27s  Know thy biases! Bringing argumentative virtues to the classroom by Oswald, Steve
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 10 
May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM 
Commentary on: Frank Zenker's "Know thy biases! Bringing 
argumentative virtues to the classroom" 
Steve Oswald 
University of Neuchâtel, Cognitive Science Centre 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Oswald, Steve, "Commentary on: Frank Zenker's "Know thy biases! Bringing argumentative virtues to the 
classroom"" (2013). OSSA Conference Archive. 192. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/192 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario 
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-7. 
Commentary on: Frank Zenker’s “Know thy biases! Bringing 
argumentative virtues to the classroom” 
 
STEVE OSWALD 
 
Cognitive Science Centre  
Dept of Language and Communication Sciences 
University of Neuchâtel 
Espace Louis-Agassiz 1, 2000 Neuchâtel 
Switzerland 
steve.oswald@unine.ch  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For quite some time now, cognitive and social psychology have been documenting 
the pervasiveness of cognitive biases in reasoning and decision making (among 
other dimensions of human cognition) but also how people struggle to get rid of 
them – achieving own bias awareness is a difficult task. Zenker’s “Know thy biases!” 
describes a concrete teaching and learning activity (TLA) meant to achieve 
debiasing. Specifically, his contribution deals with the polarization effect, which 
causes people to overestimate the magnitude of opinion difference between them 
and their opponents. The TLA under discussion is grounded on the assumption that 
traditional classroom activities such as ‘showing and telling’ fail to enable students 
to spot their own biases, but that, according to empirical studies (e.g. Pronin, Puccio, 
& Ross, 2002), putting them in situations where they are asked to consider 
adversary positions seriously – and thus evaluate them – can yield better results. 
 While I have little doubt that the purpose of Zenker’s paper is convincingly 
fulfilled, I believe that his description of the proposed TLA is ideally suited to kick-
start a discussion about the cognitive underpinnings of reasoning and its 
relationship with biases and (corresponding) debiasing processes. The following 
remarks are thus meant as theoretical expansions of Zenker’s point. 
 The reasons behind the success of the type of practical exercise envisaged to 
overcome the power of biases remain underexplored in Zenker’s contribution. I will 
try to show here that the success of the type of practical proposal defended in this 
paper constitutes evidence of the social function of reasoning (see Mercier & 
Sperber, 2011), and that it is because the TLA prompts for reasoning to be triggered 
within its natural context of occurrence (i.e., an inherently argumentative social 
context) that it has prospects of being successful. To be more specific, I think that if 
Zenker showed that the TLA works and how it works, more can be said on the 
reasons why it works. To this end, I will draw on Mercier & Sperber’s recent 
argumentative theory of reasoning (see Mercier, 2009, Mercier & Sperber, 2009, 
2011). 
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2. “REASONING AS A SOCIAL COMPETENCE” (MERCIER & SPERBER, 2011) 
 
Mercier and Sperber postulate that reasoning has evolved not for individual 
purposes but for social and communicative ones. The central function of reasoning 
would thus not be to enhance cognition (for instance by allowing individuals to 
improve their knowledge or reach better decisions) but to convince others. 
Reasoning so envisaged is therefore intimately linked to social needs, and 
 
contributes to the effectiveness and reliability of communication by enabling 
communicators to argue for their claim and by enabling addressees to assess these 
arguments. It thus increases both in quantity and in epistemic quality the 
information humans are able to share. (Mercier & Sperber, 2011, p. 71-72) 
 
Within a massively modular cognitive framework, they postulate the existence of a 
domain-specific argumentative module that evolved to produce and evaluate 
arguments. The module is assumed to operate inferentially by taking as input a 
claim and relevant information and by yielding reasons to accept or reject that claim 
in its output; it is furthermore assumed to operate both intuitively and reflectively, 
the latter corresponding to what we call reasoning proper. 
According to the theory, individuals engage in reasoning when they are 
motivated to do so: when someone explicitly or implicitly rejects their standpoint, 
when they anticipate disagreement, when they evaluate others’ public arguments or 
when they want to communicate their decisions (see Mercier, 2009, p. 102 ff.). In all 
these scenarios reasoning is triggered by social motivations: individuals basically 
feel some kind of pressure to provide evidence in support of their position. This, 
following the theory, is the natural context of occurrence of reasoning, namely a 
context of “resolution of a disagreement through discussion” (Mercier & Sperber, 
2011, p. 65). Inherently argumentative contexts are thus those where reasoning is at 
its best. 
Mercier & Sperber’s extensive article (2011) convincingly and systematically 
shows that the wealth of empirical research in the psychology of reasoning can be 
accommodated within this theory. To give but two examples, puzzling results of the 
Wason Selection Task, where groups are shown to outperform individuals, can now 
be explained in terms of the concrete argumentative nature of the selection task in 
that particular version: subjects presenting their solution are bound to face criticism 
(unless everyone agrees with them) and hence need to come up with arguments to 
support it, which constitutes reasoning incentive. A second example of the theory’s 
explanatory power is its novel construal of the confirmation bias, usually deemed to 
be one of the most important flaws in reasoning. This bias now becomes a feature of 
argument production: the theory predicts – and existing literature confirms it – that 
in contexts devoid of argumentative stakes, the bias will lead to poor outcomes (to 
the extent that the individual’s arguments are neither critically evaluated nor 
challenged), but that in social contexts of problem resolution, it will help individuals 
to find (good) arguments to support their claims (Mercier & Sperber, 2011, p. 63-
66). 
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3. REASONING AND DEBIASING: COUNTERING THE POLARIZATION EFFECT 
 
One prediction of the argumentative theory is particularly relevant to assess 
Zenker’s proposal, namely the prediction that individuals are better at reasoning (in 
terms of its outcome) when they are encouraged through interaction either to 
defend their position or to attack their opponent’s (to potentially convince the latter 
of their own position). In short, the idea is that group discussions in which 
individuals find it relevant to produce and evaluate arguments provide appropriate 
conditions for effective reasoning to be deployed. But this is not yet equivalent to 
assuming that such scenarios are ideal for debiasing purposes: we first need to say 
more about the relationship between reasoning and debiasing. 
One way of going about people’s natural propensity for bias is to consider 
that they are “nearly incorrigible cognitive optimists”, because “they take for 
granted that their spontaneous cognitive processes are highly reliable, and that the 
output of these processes does not need re-checking” (Sperber et al., 1995, p. 90). In 
the absence of critical challenge, people will expectedly stick to their mental states, 
even if these are normatively disadvantageous in some respect. The first step in 
making them aware of this disadvantage would thus be to challenge them to reflect 
on the reasons they have for holding these mental states: if they are unable to come 
up with solid justifications or if the justifications they produce are shown to be 
flawed, chances are that they will recognise the weakness of their position – 
provided they are not hopelessly dogmatic and that they allow for the possibility of 
reasonable criticism. Gaining awareness that the reasons for which they held their 
initial position are weak might in turn allow them to explain their ‘error’ as the 
result of bias. In other words, encouraging people to engage in reasoning may bring 
about a personal experience of being wrong, which is an indication that reasoning 
may be used for debiasing purposes. Additionally, and everything else being equal, 
representing and making available multiple reasons supporting a standpoint makes 
it ipso facto more vulnerable to criticism, since necessarily more information is 
available and exposed to challenge. 
Zenker’s TLA is designed to prevent the polarization effect by alerting 
participants onto their own biases. For this participants are instructed to first state 
their opinion on a debatable issue and to “call out reasons pro/con one or the other 
position” (p. 6), then to discuss, with a similarly opinioned group of students, the 
arguments supporting a different position in order to estimate their strengths and 
weaknesses and finally to publicly report “the order and structure over pro/con 
reasons” (p. 6). The task features three constraints of capital importance to trigger 
reasoning: 
 
 The topic discussed in the TLA needs to be one students polarise over 
(step 2 of the sequential description, p. 6). Difference of opinion is a 
necessary condition for argumentative exchanges to take place, so in 
this configuration students will have motives to reason. 
 The alternative position under discussion is said to entail that the 
students’ own position is false (step 5). This parameter is of crucial 
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importance because it provides students a motivation to 
argumentatively engage with said position and to resort to their 
reasoning abilities. Put more simply, the TLA puts students in a 
situation with stakes: they are requested to take seriously a position 
challenging theirs as being false, and this will arguably motivate them 
to treat counterarguments critically. 
 In step 6, the TLA requires students to dialectically relate arguments 
supporting their own position (pro-reasons) to corresponding 
counterarguments (con-reasons): this might lead students to 
relativize the weight of their own arguments by realising that the 
same aspect of the issue can be equally justified or attacked. 
Furthermore, the dialectical matrix of arguments they are instructed 
to elaborate will allow them not only to gauge arguments and 
counterarguments against each other, but also, more simply, to 
quantitatively compare the number of pro-reasons and con-reasons. 
 
The three constraints identified above make sense within the argumentative 
theory of reasoning because they provide ideal conditions for reasoning to take 
place: (i) the TLA makes sure that a debatable issue is on the table, thereby allowing 
for the possibility of argumentative exchanges; (ii) by explicitly calling their views 
into question, it prompts participants to look for arguments in favour of their 
position but also against alternative positions; (iii) it requires participants to 
explicitly relate pro and con reasons, thereby allowing for the possibility of 
relativizing opposing positions. The TLA therefore has good prospects of being 
successful because it meets the conditions for engaging the argumentative module. 
Let us also add that if at the end of the TLA debiasing has occurred and has 
successfully prevented the polarization effect, this is not a direct consequence of 
reasoning. Rather, reasoning has provided the means to lay all relevant information 
on the table for debiasing to occur. Arguably, students will be able to get rid of their 
bias only after they have been made aware, through direct perception of a difference 
between initial and final assessment of their position, that they were biased in the 
first place. 
It is interesting to note that both the research referred to by Zenker and his 
own take on the issue implicitly converge towards the predictions of the 
argumentative theory. Pronin and colleagues specifically point to the ineffectiveness 
of group discussions which are devoid of dialectical argumentative engagement 
when they suggest that 
 
[a]sking opposing partisans to sit down together, and inviting them to share their 
views and the reasons they hold them, might actually prove counterproductive, 
because such exchanges are apt to reinforce rather than weaken presumptions of 
extremity and intractability. (Pronin et al., 2002, p. 653) 
 
If you do not instruct participants to seriously engage their opponents and 
simply ask them to share (i.e., to tell) their views, their reasoning abilities may lack 
incentive. When they conclude that “[i]t is unsurprising, perhaps, that participants 
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saw peers and adversaries as less extreme after those individuals had articulated 
and even acknowledged the other side’s arguments” (ibid.), Pronin et al. are 
unwittingly echoing the idea that reasoning underpins the ability to articulate and 
acknowledge counterarguments. Similarly, when Zenker asserts that the TLA allows 
students to benefit from “a model for de-biasing that implicates charitable 
engagement with interlocutors’ views, rather than a mere self-check of one’s 
presumably good intentions” (p. 8), he is indirectly pointing to the usefulness of 
dialectifying one’s position instead of confining students into introspection, as 
predicted by the theory. In arguing that “[t]hrough such engaging, one’s own biases 
may be better discerned than without such engaging” (p. 8), Zenker also expresses 
the main tenet of the argumentative theory of reasoning, namely that argumentative 
contexts (denoted by “such engaging”) trigger reasoning, which, as we have seen, 
can contribute to debiasing. 
 
4. FURTHER REMARKS AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE TLA 
 
A few remaining questions and remarks can be added, mainly regarding the 
material used in the task and the nature of the interaction 
(collaborative/competitive) between participants of the TLA. 
One may wonder to what extent competitive attitudes might perturb the TLA. 
That is, would the TLA still be successful if students expected (and ended up 
adopting) competitive rather than cooperative attitudes? Zenker reports the 
findings of Kennedy & Pronin (2008) that “bias ascription correlates with 
opponent’s mutual expectations that the disagreement will escalate” (p. 4), thereby 
allowing us to draw the conclusion that under these conditions the TLA might fail. 
Mercier (2009, pp. 136-137) interestingly treats such cases as consequences of the 
confirmation bias: subjects who, for whatever reason, do not find it in them to be 
willing to critically evaluate their own claim might limit themselves to looking for 
evidence that confirms it. This takes us to a second question. 
In those cases, the TLA’s failure could follow from the participants’ general 
failure to reason properly. This is why the topic must be carefully selected: on the 
one hand it should be an issue students polarize over, but on the other it should not 
prevent them from “taking the other side seriously”. To take a (perhaps too) 
extreme example, a topic such as alcohol consumption and driving might trigger 
highly emotional and one-sided responses in someone who has lost a relative in a 
drinking-related car accident; in turn, this could be too strong to allow her/him to 
even consider the possibility of entertaining, for the purpose of the exercise or 
simply for the sake of it, an alternative position. This would then deny the possibility 
of taking that extra step required to provisionally give some merit to an opponent’s 
alternative position. In those cases, furthermore, we should expect the confirmation 
bias to be deployed in full effect: the participant would presumably not have it in 
her/him to seriously engage with alternative positions. This is thus something for 
the instructor to take into account in the selection of the topic. 
A second line of inquiry concerns other potential debiasing techniques. While 
empirical evidence suggests that ‘show and tell’ methods are unsuccessful, one may 
wonder if something closer to argumentative self-control strategies, within some 
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sort of “ethics of argumentation” (see Correia, 2012, section 4), may be useful. I am 
not aware of any empirical studies on these issues, but training people to develop 
specific skills such as argumentative reconstruction, abstract thinking (e.g., logic and 
statistics), playing the devil’s advocate, conscious elaboration of heuristics meant to 
impose limits onto what the subject allows herself to do argumentatively-wise or 
even the ability to be charitable, could be experimentally tested to assess their 
usefulness. This could represent additional directions of research for future studies 
of debiasing techniques. 
Finally, while the success of Zenker’s TLA seems to be interpretable in terms 
of its ability to trigger reasoning, the question of the generalizability of this 
explanation remains: would it be possible to design additional TLAs which do not 
depend on the virtues of reasoning? The polarization effect typically belongs to a 
class of biases arising within an interactive scenario where opposing views are 
discussed. But what about more ‘solitary’ biases? Are they all prone to debiasing 
when envisaged in a critical discussion? I am under the impression that the answer 
is positive, to the extent that the act of calling into question and that of justifying 
one’s position are somehow independent from the contents under consideration (in 
principle any piece of information can be critically called into question). So if 
debiasing is systematically a result of someone making their reasons for believing, 
acting, etc. manifest, chances are that reasoning will always be a privileged path to 
debiasing. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
I have tried to show that the main reason behind the success of Zenker’s TLA is to be 
found in its argumentative nature: within such context, reasoning is bound to take 
place and debiasing likely to occur. The cognitive complexity of the task should also 
be noted: in the TLA, subjects need at the same time to be able to produce and 
evaluate arguments after having been motivated to do so and it could be argued that 
this TLA provides ideal conditions to engage the argumentative module in its most 
natural domain of action. 
Beyond theoretical considerations, I also believe that the kind of research 
described here is a clear illustration of the merits of multidisciplinary convergence, 
as I have tried to show that social and cognitive psychology have much to share with 
argumentation theory the moment we address argumentative reality in the way 
Zenker does. 
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